The Documented Record
The Problem
Everything below is sourced from Groupon's own emails, Groupon's own payment records, and Groupon's own Sponsored Listing invoices. Every claim is timestamped. Every dollar amount is traceable.
What We Built
In May 2016, Groupon's video production department reached out to film our business. Agnes Bono-Miles, Coordinating Video Producer at Groupon's Chicago headquarters, wrote:
“We would like to film a video feature at your location to place on your Groupon deal page to showcase your business. Best of all, this service is absolutely free!”
— Agnes Bono-Miles, Groupon Video Producer, May 9, 2016
We responded the same day — offering to comp the crew's admission, grant early entry for technical setup, and film two tour operations. This offer was extended to fewer than 0.1% of all Groupon merchants. At the time, we were simultaneously launching three new Groupon campaigns.
By 2018, we had built three tours from scratch into dominant Groupon listings: Diamond Head Luau, Aloha Circle Island Tour, and Pearl Harbor Tour. At peak, we were running 2-3 buses per day and generating over $1.1 million in annual revenue. Our redemption rate — the percentage of customers who actually showed up — was 72%, well above industry average. Over 946 collaborative emails with our primary account manager, Tim Klocek, we refined listings, launched new campaigns, and grew together.
This was a partnership built on performance.
The Recovery That Proves Everything
In 2020, COVID collapsed Hawaii tourism. Our revenue fell 80%. Every tour operator experienced this. It is not part of this account.
What matters is 2021. We recovered to $967,791 — within 6% of our pre-pandemic peak. The same product. The same operator. The same market.
This recovery eliminates every alternative explanation for what happened next:
Every alternative is eliminated by the data. The only remaining explanation is a platform-level change to listing visibility — something controlled entirely by Groupon.
The Disappearance
The account that generated $6.3 million in lifetime revenue is now producing $28,544 per quarter. Here is how that happened:
| Year | Revenue | Vouchers | % of Recovery | Hawaii Tourism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $967,791 | 5,945 | 100% | Recovering |
| 2022 | $562,399 | 3,183 | 58% | Booming |
| 2023 | $639,121 | 4,085 | 66% | Record-breaking |
| 2024 | $533,257 | 3,068 | 55% | Record-breaking |
| 2025 | $232,639 | 1,363 | 24% | Record-breaking |
| 2026 Q1 | $28,544 | 159 | 12% ann. | Record-breaking |
Our daily listing views dropped from over 1,200 to approximately 50. Both tours experienced the same directional decline. This is consistent with a platform-level visibility change — not a product-specific issue.
The Sponsored Listings Program
In February 2022, our account manager introduced Groupon's Sponsored Listings — a paid advertising product within the marketplace. We were told this was a cost-per-click program. We invested.
Early results appeared strong. Our account manager reported:
“$577.49 spent has resulted in 20 sales... at least 834% earned above the $145.40 that was spent.”
— Tim Klocek, Account Manager, March 7, 2022
Within weeks, we were seeing 992% return on ad spend. We scaled our budgets. We asked to double the daily spend. At one point we requested $10,000 wallet balances for both tour accounts. The numbers made the investment look exceptional.
What we were not told: Groupon was also deducting their standard commission on every sale generated through Sponsored Listings.
The return-on-ad-spend figures presented to us were calculated against gross sale value — not against our actual net payment after Groupon's commission was extracted. When CPC advertising fees, Groupon's commission, and our tour operating costs were combined, every Sponsored Listing sale produced a net loss.
We were paying to lose money — on the basis of economics that were misrepresented to us.
Timeline
Sponsored Listings introduced. CPC rate: $0.80 per click.
Strong initial ROAS reported. We scale budgets.
"My entire sponsored listing section is not there anymore. I also noticed a big dip in Impressions, Clicks, and Sales... We went 0 for four straight days... And Oahu is packed with people."
CPC rate increased from $0.80 to $1.50 — an 88% increase. No justification provided.
"Despite about a 400% ROAS over the last 30 days, I am sad to report that the campaign has not been running since January the 5th." The campaign had been inactive for 15 days. We were not notified.
"The data never shows this type of behavior naturally... To have zero sales on the sponsored campaign in 8 days despite 8,200 impressions makes me slightly concerned."
"Both of our sponsored listings for Circle Island and Pearl Harbor are down. Will someone please get back to me?" Five days passed with no response.
"I would not like the presence of the ad campaign to affect the natural, organic listings that are normally on Groupon. I seem to notice that when the ads are active that our normal listing is pushed down to page two or three."
Every Insertion Order we signed contained one consistent clause: “No performance guarantee.”
Total Sponsored Listing fees paid: $64,444.37 — across 47 invoices, over 28 months.
The Financial Record
| Category | Amount | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Sponsored Listing CPC fees | $64,444 | 47 invoices, Mar 2022 – Jun 2024 |
| Clawbacks and adjustments | $248,099 | 1,023 transactions, payment records |
| Estimated margin loss on misrepresented sponsored sales | ~$100,000+ | CPC + undisclosed commission + operating costs |
| Total documented extraction beyond standard commission | $312,543+ |
This does not include Groupon's standard commission on $6.3 million in gross revenue.
The Pattern
The following pattern is documented across the complete record:
This record was compiled from a Google Takeout email export, Groupon's merchant payment portal, and Groupon's Sponsored Listing invoice system. The methodology is replicable for any merchant with access to their own Groupon email archive, payment history, and Sponsored Listing invoices.
The Human Cost
The numbers above represent real operations that were dismantled. A reservations department that once struggled to keep up with the volume of incoming calls went silent. Tour guides who had built expertise on these routes over years lost their livelihoods. Bus drivers who ran 2-3 routes daily had nothing to drive.
A decade of training, equipment, vendor relationships, and operational infrastructure — built through relentless attention to service quality — was unwound not by market forces, but by visibility decisions controlled entirely by the platform.